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Abstract:  This  article  introduces  a  distinction between two ways of
thinking  the  common  and  the  political  in  contemporary,  post-
foundational political thought which I call  'political' and  'impolitical'.
Both stances share the idea that the community is both impossible and
necessary. Nonetheless, while the political perspective seeks to think a
new political subjectivity to produce a new commonality, the impolitical
will try to think ways of desubjectification in order to avoid cooperating
with any form of Power. The paper tries to show their useful insights
and to point out their limits to re-think the common and politics in
times of neoliberal governmentality. 
Key  words: community,  politics,  impolitical,  post-marxism,
subjectivity, post-foundationalism.
Resumen: Este artículo introduce una distinción entre dos modos de
pensar  lo  común  y  lo  político  en  el  pensamiento  político  post-
fundacional  que  llamo  'político' e  'impolítico'.  Ambas  posiciones
comparten  la  idea  de  que  la  comunidad  es  a  la  vez  imposible  y
necesaria. No obstante, mientras la perspectiva política busca pensar
1 A first draft of this paper was read at the conference  What is the common?,
Gothenburg,  October  2009.  I  would  like  to  thank  Diego  Rossello,  Bruno
Bosteels, Emilio Lo Valvo and Emiliano Sacchi for reading this paper at that
time. I  also would like to thank Ingrid Diran for  her useful  comments and
revision of this paper.
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una nueva  subjetividad política  para  producir  una nueva  forma de  lo
común,  la  impolítica  intentará  pensar  modos  de  desubjetivación  para
evitar cooperar con cualquier forma de Poder. El artículo busca mostrar
las apreciaciones útiles y a la vez señalar los límites de estas posiciones
para repensar lo común y lo político en tiempos de gubernamentalidad
neoliberal. 
Palabras  Clave: comunidad,  política,  impolítico,  post-marxismo,
subjetividad, post-fundacionalismo.
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I. Introduction
n this article I introduce a distinction between two ways of thinking
the  common  and  the  political  in  contemporary,  post-foundational
political  thought  (Marchart  2007)  which  I  call  'political' and
'impolitical' (Esposito 1999). I stage this dialogue in order to analyze how
these theories can come to terms with the problems posed by a society in
which our practices are captured by the dispositifs of control and no solid
ground  can  be  found  for  our  being-in-common.  I  maintain  that  both
stances share the view of community as simultaneously  impossible and
necessary.  Nonetheless, while the  political perspective seeks to re-think
political  subjectivities  in  order  to  produce a  new  commonality,  the
impolitical will try to think modes of desubjectification as a way to avoid
cooperating with Power. 
I
The thinkers I will deal with here have been trying to rethink the
common given both  the  absence  of  any  stable  foundation for  political
action and the ultimate  impossibility  of  a  reconciled community.  They
share the vision that politics are indispensable as long as the negation or
even foreclosure of antagonism returns in the Real of even greater violence
(Mouffe 1993; 2000 & 2005) while conflict and dissent represent the core
of politics (Esposito 1988; 1993). On the other hand, both stances would
agree that the political is the space of the in-common as such. (Nancy 1993,
139) Put otherwise, the political is the expression of the common which
continually actualizes and redefines it. As a result, community is not a
stable, reified entity or institution. Rather, it is a conflictive dimension in
which political subjects co-ek-sist.2 
Bearing these theoretical assumptions in mind, I suggest that the
two  perspectives  —'political' and  'impolitical'—  avoid  reproducing  the
traditional  gesture  of  political  philosophy,  namely,  instituting  a  self-
identical  depoliticized  community.  On  the  contrary,  they  assume  that
antagonism  is  unavoidable  and  that  the  full  reconciliation  of  the
2 I use this term bearing in mind Heidegger’s depiction of  Dasein as an Ek-sistent
together with his notion of Mitsein. With the notion of ek-sistence Heidegger tried
to undo the metaphysical distinction between essence and existence, and show
that Dasein is open to Being and implied in the world around him as In-der-Welt-
Sein. I add the “co-” of co-ek-sistence recovering the Heideggerian notion of Mitsein
to  stress  that  political  subjects  always-already  share,  constitutively,  this
experience of the outside, of ecstasy, even of freedom in the ontological sense. It is
precisely this notion of Mitsein that was rethought by Nancy and Esposito in order
to elaborate a non-reified or subjectivist notion of community.
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community  is  impossible.  However,  I  suggest  that  their  different
approaches to the relation between the common and politics, subjectivity
and  political  agency,  leads  to  importantly  different  answers  to  the
contemporary political situation. 
To illuminate the first perspective, I will draw mainly on two major
representatives of Lacanian post-Marxism: Laclau and Žižek. I also stage
a dialogue with Rancière, whose theory occupies an intermediate position
between both approaches.3 For the second, I will comment on two Italian
philosophers, Agamben and Esposito, whose works bear the influence of
Heidegger since the 1970s, and of Foucault and Deleuze in the last two
decades.4 
The first perspective, which I call ‘political’, holds that even if the full
realization of the community (full emancipation) is impossible, it is still
necessary to employ negativity towards a positive project with a definite
subject. The second, ‘impolitical’ perspective thinks the political from its
borders and thus links the common to inoperativeness (Blanchot), thereby
deconstructing  an  ontology  based  on  the  preeminence  of  praxis and
subjectivity.  In this  sense,  while  Laclau and Žižek  reinstate  a  form of
socially  construed  transcendence,  Agamben  and  Esposito  oppose  the
community to such transcendence, which they figure as the continuation
to a tradition of  theologico-political  sovereignty always founded in and
upon violent exclusions. In this sense, while the former perspective sees
political  representation  as  necessary,  the  latter  suggests  that  a
community of  singularities is  unrepresentable,  a fact which deactivates
any productive overcoming of negativity, any Aufhebung. 
In the next sections, I try to give a synthetic and inevitably simplified
account  of  the different  author’s  perspectives on the common and the
political  in their  own terms.  I  do so in order to  elucidate the  political
potential  of  each perspective  for  helping  us re-think the  operations  of
power  and  the  opportunities  of  political  action.  In  the  process  of  this
3 I thank an anonymous reviewer for helping me reflect more seriously on this issue.
I will develop this idea further in the following sections.
4 We do not have enough space here to delve into the position that has developed
more  explicitly  the  notion  of  the  common  and  the  multitude  in  recent  years
drawing on the tradition of immanence that runs from Spinoza to Deleuze: that of
Hardt & Negri, Lazzarato, Virno, etc. Hardt & Negri understand the common as the
common-wealth “of the material world” (mainly natural resources) and the “results
of  social  production  that  are  necessary  for  social  interaction  and  further
production, such as knowledges, languages,  codes,  information, affects, and so
forth” (2009, viii). This perspective and that of an emerging bioeconomics will be
analyzed in a future paper.
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mutual delimitation, moreover, the deadlocks of each perspective will also
come  to  light.  I  want  to  suggest  that  these  authors  attempt  to  offer
political  alternatives  to  what  has  been  perceived  in  the  West  as
depoliticization, without reinstating a normative discourse. And yet, as I
will seek to demonstrate, only a mutual encounter of the two perspectives
can offer glimpses of  a proper account of  today’s forms of  governance.
Without such an encounter, activism based on the 'political' perspective’s
demands  can  reinforce  domination  in  our society  of  control  (Deleuze),
while  'impolitical' forms of retreat and  inoperativeness can amount to a
withdrawal into an individual, aesthetic experience. Seen as a dialectical
pair, the two positions can correct one another: the political stance serves
to  avoid  a  nihilistic  stance  towards  politics,  while  impolitical thought
might be a good antidote for preventing sacrificial and authoritarian forms
of transcendence. Thus, in the final part of the paper I will suggest that
an  engagement  with  Žižek’s  analysis  of  capitalism  and  the  full
commodification of social life actually enables Agamben’s reflections on
use to gain new cogency as an alternative economy of social interaction,
production and enjoyment.
II. The political perspective: from radical democracy to the universal 
exception
The political perspective I will consider here is that of so-called Post-
Marxist  thinkers.  Post-Marxism,  as  elaborated  by  Ernesto  Laclau  and
Chantal  Mouffe  (1985),  was  a  deconstruction  of  the  essentialist  and
economicist postulates of classical Marxism, giving priority to antagonism
over  objective  contradiction to  understand  social  change,  thereby
rethinking the Gramscian theory of hegemony in order to elaborate a new
political  theory  from  the  Left.  Whereas  classical  Marxism  understood
antagonism as class struggle and the proletariat as the subject of social
emancipation,  Laclau  and  Mouffe  underlined  the  contingent  nature  of
politics, which means that there is no privileged subject, locus or form of
antagonism.  Nonetheless,  even  if  antagonism,  which  ‘prevents  society
from  being’,  is  insurmountable  (1990)  it  is  still  necessary  to  posit  a
political subject as the remainder of radical negativity that can lead to a
new,  more  emancipated form of  commonality.  This  political  subject  is
seen as the positive result of an addition of differential negativities.
For  Ernesto  Laclau,  the  quasi-transcendental  dislocation  that
prevents  society  from  achieving  full  reconciliation  makes  possible  the
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notion  of  radical  democracy (Laclau  &  Mouffe  1985).  Far  from
characterizing a political regime, radical democracy indicates the potential
to democratize every realm of social life within a pluralistic, multicultural
society.  It  assumes the necessity of  contingency (Marchart  2007, 11ss)
and antagonism, avoiding any totalitarian closure of the social whole. In
this  way,  Laclau  and  Mouffe  supported  liberal  democracy  while
simultaneously re-evaluated the ontological role of politics. If for Marxism
politics is traditionally configured in instrumental terms and reduced to
the domain of the State, for Laclau and Mouffe politics is an instituting
social practice that has no predefined ground, locus, subject or content. 
Laclau explains the logic of politics through an ontology based on
discourse  analysis  and  a  generalized  rhetoric (2004,  13)  in  which any
social  practice  can  be  understood  as  discursive  insofar  as  it  conveys
meaning  (1990,  2004;  Laclau  &  Mouffe,  1985).  In  his  theory,  social
identities work as signifiers for other signifiers, and are thereby relational
and differential.  These identities come about as the result of  demands,
which are the minimum unit of social analysis. Different demands can be
made to the political authorities by diverse groups which constitute their
social  identities through them. As long as these demands are satisfied
differentially by the Administration, no counter-hegemonic commonality is
formed. But when a quantity of them cannot be satisfied, a new central
demand can emerge as the signifier of a common lack, and a  chain of
equivalences between different demands/identities can be formed around
an  empty signifier.5 Empty signifiers “matter to politics” (1996) because
they can give name to —and condense— a common lack. Thus they give
rise to a hegemonic relation through the articulation of different demands
and the affective investments in a name, and this, in return, retroactively
constitutes  the  common  identity.  For  Laclau,  every  social  identity  is
politically construed this way. It does not precede its political expression.
Identities are not the result of positive contents but of a common lack,
and a chain of equivalences between different identities gives place to ‘the
people’ as a political subjectivity when an antagonistic bloc towards those
in power is formed around an empty signifier. This is, briefly put, the logic
that characterizes Laclau’s ‘populism’ (2005 & 1979).
5 A chain of equivalences is an aggregate of negativities around an empty signifier.
For instance, when ‘democracy’ is felt by most people as lacking, different people
demands  ‘democracy’.  Then,  any  political  group  which  can  identify  its  own
struggle with that empty signifier can hegemonize the political situation forming a
chain of equivalencies that articulates those different demands and identities.
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Thus, Laclau’s rhetorical ontology is immediately political insofar as
every social identity is politically constructed and subject to  metonymic
displacements (difference)  and  metaphorical  condensations (equivalence).
The  negativity  of  every  signifier  and  its  openness  to  a  plurality  of
‘language games’ (Wittgenstein) accounts for Laclau’s anti-essentialism, as
there is no positive term, no concrete or predefined demand that will lead
to hegemony or to political investments. Also, there is no privileged locus
or subjectivity for social antagonism, since every social identity is strictly
differential,  not  depending on positive  contents,  allowing a  plurality  of
contingent  language  games  and  political  identities  to  be  displayed.
Therefore, every social identity is differential. However, this differentiality
is  partially  suspended when a new political  commonality  is  formed as
antagonistic to those in power, when a new hegemonic signifier/Subject
arises. But this can only take place through the emergence of a popular
demand. 
We  will  call  a  demand  which…  remains  isolated  a  democratic demand.  A
plurality of demands which, through their equivalential articulation, constitute
a broader social subjectivity we will call popular demands — they start, at a
very incipient level, to constitute the 'people' as a potential historical actor. Here
we  have,  in  embryo,  a  populist  configuration.  We  already  have  two  clear
preconditions of populism: (1) the formation of an internal antagonistic frontier
separating  the  'people'  from  power;  and  (2)  an  equivalential  articulation  of
demands  making  the  emergence  of  the  'people'  possible.  There  is  a  third
precondition… the unification of these various demands… into a stable system
of signification (2005, 74).
As we can see, Laclau maintains that 'the people' is the political and
antagonistic  subject  to  'those in power' that emerges out  of  a political
construction.  For  Laclau,  politics  are  always  hegemonic,  since  a
particularity must assume the representation of the social whole through
the  constitution  of  a  chain  of  equivalences.  Politics  are  also  ‘populist’
since  the  construction  of  the  people  is  its  first  task:  “There  is  no
hegemony without constructing a popular identity out of  a plurality of
democratic demands” (2005, 95).
In a similar way, Rancière maintains that the political community
can never be identical to itself because there are politics, because a part
which has no assigned part in the community, the people, affirms itself
and its  freedom,  as linguistic  beings equal  to any other,  revealing the
existence of politics as a space of sharing [partage]. Politics are practiced
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by the party of the poor, as an activity of a common that is necessarily
litigious (Rancière 1999)  and that  implies a democratic  subjectification
that puts into question the given organization of society. In this sense,
democracy is 
The institution of politics itself, the system of forms of subjectification through
which any order of distribution of bodies into functions corresponding to their
'nature' and places corresponding to their functions is undermined (Rancière
1999, 101). 
Thus,  whereas  Laclau  emphasizes  the  impossibility  of  a  self-
presentation  of  the  people  in  contemporary  society,  and  therefore  the
necessity  of  political  representation  to  articulate  different  demands6,
Rancière  (1999  &  2007)  sees  democracy  as  consisting  of  exceptional
moments of politicization in which the common emerges from the bottom,
contesting a state of affairs in which all parts of the society are assigned,
asserting  itself  instead  as  an  an-archic  government  where  no  title  is
needed to govern. 
The two thinkers share the notion of contingency as the condition of
(im)possibility of any social order and the opposition between politics and
administration (which Rancière calls 'police'); politics is what disturbs the
smooth functioning of the administration. However, Laclau extends the
logic of contingency further than Rancière: against the misleading idea —
frequent in radical political thought— that conservative politics are the
negation of politics as such, Laclau defines politics by structure and not
by  content.  Conservative  politics,  for  him,  are  as  political  as  radical
politics.  Thus,  Laclau criticizes  Rancière  for  excessively  identifying  the
possibility of politics with emancipation (Laclau 2008b). 
Accordingly,  Laclau shows that no predefined realm or content is
inherently political. Everything can be politicized since nothing is political
in itself. In his view, politics are always hegemonic, so any universal value
will be contaminated by a particularity that will contingently incarnate a
universal  signifier,  which means that  universality  is  not  achievable  as
such.  This  is  tantamount  in  avoiding  any  form  of  moral  or  political
imperialism.
6 Along this path, Laclau will criticize ‘immanentist’ theories of the multitude which,
in his view, affirm that there is no need of such political articulation and that any
form of  political  struggle  affects  directly the core of  the Empire  (Laclau, 2005;
2008). However, in Commonwealth Hardt & Negri address the problem of political
articulation.
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At  this  point,  however,  we  may  begin  to  note  some  potential
problems in Laclau’s account. First, the axiomatic assertion that political
representation must be invested in a name that unifies “these various
demands  […] into  a  stable  system  of  signification”  and  the  role  of
leadership in Laclau’s idea of populism reveal that libidinal investments in
a  name  cannot  be  easily  separated  from  the  investments  in  a  body.
Indeed,  this  investments  seem to  unify  different  demands  within  “the
name  of  the  leader”  and  not  within  empty  signifiers  like  ‘justice’  or
‘democracy’.  When one recognizes  that  the  master  signifier  is  also  the
master’s signifier, the real question becomes who has the power to impose
meaning to these signifiers and incarnate them. In this context, Laclau’s
theory  implies  that  effective  political  identities  can  only  be  construed
through  strong  leadership,  which,  in  my  view,  can  lead  to  political
heteronomy.
The second critique points  to  the  limited capacity  of  an ontology
based on the notion of demand to characterize today’s politics, especially
in developed societies where most demands are satisfied by the market.
Even if one insists that Laclau’s account is ontological, he recognizes that
any ontology is molded by the ontic context of its production, enabling us
to critique him on these grounds. Therefore, I see strong limits in Laclau’s
account on this point. First, it neither explains how demands and lack are
created  in  our  capitalistic  societies,  nor  the  way  in  which  today’s
capitalism  is  predicated  not  on  demands  but  rather  upon  the
productiveness of desire. Furthermore, even if we accepted that we desire
something to fill a lack, this lack and the objects we desire would already
be determined by Ideology. Ideology is what ‘teaches’ us how and what to
desire (Žižek) within the noopolitical dispositifs of neoliberal capitalism.7
These  problems  of  the  ideological  production  of  desire  and  the
political role of enjoyment are analyzed by Slavoj Žižek, who in his first
writings supported the Laclauian idea of radical democracy, with its anti-
totalitarian and pluralistic thrust (1989). Later, he criticized the logic of
radical contingency to redefine antagonism as class struggle (2000). For
him, there is not only a need to understand the formal logic of the political
—as Laclau would do— but also to posit a positive content that accounts
7 With  noopolitics (nous:  intellect)  Lazzarato (2004)  refers  to a set  of  technics of
control exerted upon the brain, implying its attention in order to control memory
and its virtual potentialities. A paradigmatic example of these is marketing and
advertising, which strive to capture our attention in order to modify our ways of
feeling, thinking and behaving.
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for the possibility of social change. For even if the struggles of different
social identities can be ‘progressive’, they are not necessarily challenging
what in his view always returns to the same place:  capitalism as  Real
(1999, 2000). He maintains that radical democracy should no longer be a
(political) democracy, since liberal democracy cannot be separated from
capitalism.  Put  differently:  in  Žižek’s  view,  since  capitalism  is  the
condition  of  possibility  of  liberal  democracy,  if  we  want  to  overcome
capitalism we must also be ready to get rid of democracy. 
No wonder that Laclau accused Žižek of recalling the ‘worst tradition
of non-deconstructed Marxism’ and of wrongly reading Althusserian over-
determination as  ‘determination  in  the  last  instance’  (2000  &  2008).
Whereas Laclau thinks that there is  no transcendental  locus for social
antagonism  and  that  every  political  articulation  is  contingent,  Žižek
maintains  that  the  very  possibility  to  perceive  social  identities  as
contingent  only  emerges  in  late  capitalism.  Indeed,  the  concept  of
contingency is for him the quasi-transcendental condition of possibility of
our multicultural societies. Thus, in the last decade Žižek has associated
Laclau’s  position with  liberal  multiculturalism and also  dismissed any
form  of  ‘historicism’,  ‘relativism’  or  ‘deconstructionism’  as  part  of  the
cultural logic of late, postmodern capitalism. 
In this sense, whereas Laclau thinks politics through contingently
construed  identities,  where  universalism  is  always  contaminated  by
particularism,  Žižek  will  defend  the  possibility  of  a  direct  access  to
Universality.  However,  he  will  avoid  a  condemnatory  approach  to
substantial identities. With regards to the notion of community, Žižek does
not propose only a formal or negative approach like the impolitical one (see
below). He states that when we confront ethnically-based communities,
we must differentiate between the  latent dream thought  and the desire
expressed in a dream. Therefore, the roots of fascism are not to be sought
in the legitimate desire to form a substantial community. Rather, fascism
inheres only in a way of  symbolizing this wish as an explicit ideological
text. Hence, fascist ideology tries to obscure the structural impossibility of
fully realizing a community by blaming one of the community’s parts for
the presence of antagonism (Žižek 1993 & 2000). On the other hand, he
states  that  what  holds  communities  together  is  not  a  common
identification but rather a dis-identification, a way of organizing enjoyment
through the disavowed transgression of public rules (2005, 55): “the fear
of  'excessive'  identification is  […] the  fundamental  feature  of  the  late-
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capitalist  ideology” (1993,  237).  Hence  he  maintains  —in  contrast  to
Laclau—  that  over-identification is  more  subversive  than  fighting
‘essentialism’ and ‘fixed-identities’. 
Also Rancière will theorize disidentification but in a different sense.
Rather  than  organizing  communal  enjoyment,  disidentification  is  a
necessary  step  in  political  subjetification,  in  which  a  part  of  the
community  stages  a  wrong that  challenges  the  current  division of  the
sensible  and  removes  itself  from  the  names  and  places  that  where
assigned  to  it.  For  Rancière,  politics  is  a  matter  of  'modes  of
subjectification'.
By subjectification I mean the production through a series of actions of a body
and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of
experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of the field of
experience (1999, 35).
At the same time: 
Any subjectification is a disidentification, removal from the naturalness of  a
place, the opening up of a subject space where anyone can be counted since it
is the space where those of no account are counted, where a connection is made
between having a part and having no part (1999, 36).
As  we  will  see,  these  ideas  of  disidentification  together  with  the
conception of politics as  interruption of the given order (police) are also
crucial  for  the  impolitical  approach.  However,  since  disidentification
implies for Rancière a way of political subjectification of a part that names
itself the  people and identifies itself “with the whole of the community”
(1999, 9), Rancière’s approach might be considered a political one. 
In  his  own  terms,  he  shares  Laclau’s  and  Žižek’s  idea  that
community  is  both  necessary  and  impossible  because  there  is  an
antagonism which prevents society from being. For Žižek, however, this
Real is  a  positive  ‘entity’  called  capitalism.  And  yet  its  exception,  its
symptom, (or the part of those who have no part in Rancière’s terms) is the
place from which true Universality can emerge against globalization (i.e.
the universalization of Capital).  In this sense, against the  'postmodern'
assertion  of  contingency,  Žižek  affirms,  following  Alain  Badiou,  the
existence of a Truth which can only be seen from the point of  view of
those  already committed to  it  (1989;  1997;  2000 & 2004).  Indeed,  for
Žižek a true community, even human survival, hinges upon the assertion
of Truth and of a new form of communism, since the market can only lead
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to  catastrophe  (2008,  420-30).  In  this  sense,  besides  the  crucial
antagonism  between  the  excluded  and  the  included,  Žižek  points  out
three  domains of  antagonisms between the commons (Negri)  and their
commodification:  in  culture  or  socio-symbolic  space,  in  outer  nature
(environment) and inner nature (biogenetics). 
It  is  this  reference  to  'commons'  —this  substance  of  productivity  which  is
neither private nor public— which justifies the resuscitation of the notion of
communism. The commons can thus be linked to what Hegel… deployed as die
Sache,  the  shared  social  thing-cause,  «the  work  of  all  and  everyone»,  the
substance kept alive by incessant subjective productivity (2008, 429).
Affirming the necessity of communism for the world to survive, Žižek
maintains that the real utopists are the free-market liberals who believe
we have approached the end of history and dream of a happy capitalism
without antagonism. 
So, rather than providing the formal logic of the political, Žižek tries
to elaborate a critique of our society, showing that every realm of social
life  is  being  commodified  and  that,  under  certain  circumstances,  the
desire to form a substantial community can lead to forms of resistance to
full commodification.
Like Laclau, however, Zizek’s view also reveals some inconsistencies.
For one, naming capitalism as Real symbolizes the Real, which in turn
makes it insurmountable: we can work to change our symbolic order, but
something that is Real is by definition beyond our reach. 
To sum up, what characterizes the political perspective is the idea
that antagonism is unavoidable and, at the same time, that every social
practice can be, in the last resort, political. Nonetheless, whereas Laclau,
Mouffe and Rancière stress the contingent nature of politics, Žižek tries to
symbolize antagonism that impedes society’s fullness as  'class struggle'.
In this sense, whereas the first authors think the formal conditions for
radical-democratic  politics,  the  latter  seems  more  ready  to  think  the
problems that  arise  in  today’s  capitalism,  connecting  his  reflection on
ideology with the problem of the expropriation of the common raised by
Hardt  and  Negri.  This  notion  of  the  common  beyond  the  opposition
between public and private leads us to the impolitical perspective and its
focus on the notions of singularity and inoperativeness. 
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III. The impolitical perspective: the exposure to the common
The  impolitical perspective,  like its political  counterpart,  conceives
politics as a conflictive reality. However, impolitical theorists focus on the
community as  the  key  figure  to  think  the  common  as  a  sphere  of
constitutively  impossible  harmony.  Although  this  approach  shares  the
anti-identitarian, anti-totalitarian and anti-essentialist view of politics we
find in Laclau and Mouffe, it does not consider the common as a result of
political  subjectification  and  libidinal  investments.  Impolitical  thought
conceives the common as a dimension that precedes and exceeds both
politics  and subjectivity giving ‘voice’  to coexistence:  something that  is
impossible to produce. 
In  fact,  this  perspective  considers  politics  as  an  interruption that
does not  lead to  new institutional  foundations.8 Thinking the common
from a  philosophy  of  im-potentiality (Agamben  2005a),  and  as  neither
substantial nor subjective, the impolitical also opposes any stance that
founds the common in the proprium (as identities or interests), or in any
presupposition. The community does not belong to its subjects and the
subjects  don’t  belong  to  the  community:  community  is  rather  the
transcendental  condition  that  expropriates  them  as  closed  selves,
exposing them to their being-in-common. In this sense, the community is a
limit-concept  of  political  philosophy  because  it  remains  ontologically
impossible (Tarizzo 2003). In our view, the political stake of this thought
is  to  empty  any  form  of  political  mediation  and  sovereignty  of  its
foundations in order to think coexistence beyond any transcendent Power.
But let us clarify what we understand by impolitical (also translated
recently  as  unpolitical).  The term  impolitico was first  used by Massimo
Cacciari in an article about Nietzsche (1978) and re-elaborated by Roberto
Esposito  (1988  &  1993),  as  a  way  to  consider  the  political  from  its
borders, staging an alternative to both political theology and modern de-
politicization.  Its  stance  is  neither  directly  political,  nor  anti-political,
since that would presuppose the reduction of politics to a Value or Norm
and a dialectical movement which this kind of thought tries to avoid. The
impolitical implied  a  movement  of  retreat (Nancy  and  Lacoue-Labarthe
1983) which redefined the relation between philosophy and politics, once
the  model  of  the  Gramscian  organic  intellectual proved  no  longer
8 As mentioned above, also Rancière shares the idea of politics as an interruption.
In his case, this interruption enables the expression of an egalitarian logic through
political subjectification.
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practicable for most of  the European Left.  For Esposito,  the  impolitical
takes us beyond any political  philosophy, understood as a tradition in
which politics is measured by its correspondence with a good philosophy
and philosophy is evaluated by its capacity to transform politics (1999).
Undoubtedly, most intellectuals we would include in the ‘political’
perspective also  retreat into an ontological  reflection that departs from
political philosophy thus described. But while in the political perspective
there is a need to rethink political subjectivity and emancipation, for the
impolitical vision, politics and community defy subjectivity and actually
imply processes of de-subjectification. At the same time, the impolitical
tries to think the factum of the political in a realistic, non-apologetic way. 
The philosopher who develops an explicit reflection on the impolitical
in these terms is Roberto Esposito, who maintained in the 1980’s that our
political language was obsolete since our present-day reality could not be
apprehended through it.9 As long as there was no alternative language,
the  only  possibility  was  to  think  the  political  in  negative  terms,
deconstructing its  traditional  categories.  The  impolitical stance tried to
show  the  ambiguities  and  deadlocks  of  our  political  concepts  and
dichotomies,  overturning the  political  notions of  modernity  in order  to
exhibit the void that inhabits their core (Weil in Esposito 1988; 1996). 
This deconstruction of every political term was also employed to re-
think the notion of community. Traditionally, the community was thought
as  the  result  of  shared properties  (ethnicity,  race,  language,  territory),
projects or interests. On the contrary, the impolitical stance would begin
by thinking community as 'structured' by sharing a common impossibility:
for instance, that of dying in the place of the other (Blanchot 1983) or of
sharing the other’s death (Nancy 1999) or dying together as in Bataille’s
account of Numancia (Esposito 1999). 
Later,  presenting  this  deconstructive  insight  in  positive  terms,
Esposito elaborated a tension between Communitas and Immunitas. Both
terms share the reference to munus, understood as a compulsory gift, but
differ in the way they relate to it.10 If im-munitas designates the exemption,
the  dispensation  from  the  common  munus that  characterizes  modern
philosophical, juridical, anthropological and medical thought through the
9 In the last decade, Esposito seems to have found this positive language that can
help us understand our present in biopolitics and the paradigm of immunization
(2002, 2004, 2007).
10 As Esposito states, the concept of munus has three meanings: onus, officium and
donum. However, he clearly privileges the latter.
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assertion of the proprium, com-munitas implies a positive relation (cum) to
it, our common exposure to a threatening, violent, mandatory gift. What
we have in common, then, is nothing but this gift, this exposure to the
possibility  of  mutual  contagion,  which  has  to  be  avoided  for  any
immunitarian stance that protects life through its negation. 
Nonetheless,  a  form  of  immunity  is  necessary  if  life  is  to  be
conserved or developed. In this sense, present-day biopower —in which
the protection and increase of  the quality of  life is the only issue that
legitimizes  a  government—  can  be  understood  through  immunization
paradigm  as  a  series  of  measures  to  protect  communitarian  and
individual life within the framework of a self-same social body in which
the threatening dimension of the common, the possibility of transgressing
boundaries, is kept at bay. When an exaggerated form of immunization
arises, it ends up attacking the same body it strives to protect, as in auto-
immune  diseases.  But  immunity  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  a
thanatological,  auto-immunitarian outcome. To the contrary,  Esposito’s
idea  of  a  common immunity,  exemplified  by  pregnancy, in  which  the
mother protects the embryo despite the  difference of their genetic codes
(2002),  offers  a  paradigm  in  which  life  emerges  through  the  conflict
between two immunities. In this sense, difference becomes the condition
for  coexistence  and  common  growth  in  an  ontology  based  not  on
presupposition but in ex-position. It is precisely through the concept of ex-
position  that  Esposito  will  try  to  think  affirmative,  communitarian
biopolitics. 
By 'ex-position' we must understand a radical shift in the concept of
co-existence.  Traditional  metaphysics  have  thought  a  Ground  or
Substance of which the concrete existence would derive its meaning. In
politics,  there  was  always  the  idea  of  a  shared,  presupposed  element
grounding the community or a Subject instituting it. On the contrary, the
logic  of  exposition  deconstructs  the  opposition  between  essence  and
appearance, expressing that things, bodies, ideas, etc., co-belong without
any ground other than co-belonging itself. Indeed,  the common is not a
result  of  some  prior  ground  but  the  pure  event  of  being-with,  which  is
another way to affirm radical contingency.
The  logic  of  exposition is  also  developed  by  Agamben’s  notion  of
community as the co-appearance of  ‘whatever singularities’  (1990).  For
Agamben,  power  dispositifs and  metaphysical  thought  always  work by
separating two poles, producing the possibility of an inclusive exclusion of
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one of  them by the other:  bios and  zoé,  logos and  phoné,  human and
animal.  In  historic  communities  this  exclusion  renders  the  excluded
sacer,  i.e.,  possible  to  kill  without  committing  homicide  or  sacrifice,
thereby  turning  exclusion into  a  transcendental  presupposition  for
belonging. Agamben opposes to this the notion of the  coming community
(1990), which is not founded in any subjective property as identities or
interests,  but  rather  on  the  very  event  of  co-belonging  without  any
presupposition. Against the notion of a community of those who don’t have
one (Bataille, Nancy, Blanchot) or as nothing in common (Esposito, 1998)
he thinks of  a community in which  the  only  condition for  belonging is
belonging itself (1990). 
Agamben is also critical of the stances which —like that of Esposito
and Mauss— focus on the notion of  mandatory gift.  Agamben instead
privileges the notion of  grace, as “the ability to use the sphere of social
determinations and services in its totality” (2008b, 115). For Agamben,
grace does not found social exchanges, but rather interrupts them. This
insistence on grace (charis) derives from the Pauline and later Franciscan
notion of use (chrésis) —which deactivates obligations and the Law— as
opposed to property (dominium), and leads him to propose profanations as
the restitution of objects to a free use, against the idea of  secularization,
in which the sacred dimension and its power effects secretly insist (2005a;
2011b).11 Hence, Agamben understands the messianic community as an
interruption of the proprium through a new, profane use: “the messianic
vocation is not a right and does not constitute an identity: it is a generic
Potentiality which is used without being its proprietors” (2008b, 31).
This notion of the messianic community is developed by Agamben in
his reading of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, in which he explores the logic
of as-if-not (hos me) and of deactivation (katargein).12 For Agamben, Paul is
not the founder of universalism as Badiou (1997) maintains but rather
the one who divides every nomistic division with the imperceptible Apelles’
11 As we can see, this idea is crucial in our digital era, in which the conditions for a
free and common use of the produce of the general intellect are thwarted by the
institution of  property and the commodification of  the common. For Negri  and
Hardt,  this  fully  intellectualization  of  labor,  with  its  accent  on  affects  and
communication preannounces the new communism of the multitude (1995, 2000,
2004,  2009).  Agamben  has  also  theorized  about  the  general  intellect and  the
multitude in order to rethink the common and to characterize his notion of form-
of-life  (2000,  10-11).  However,  departing  from Negri’s  thought,  he  opposes  the
dominant role of production and subjectivity in Western metaphysics.
12 Agamben notes that the French désœuvrement (Kojeve, Bataille, Blanchot, Nancy)
is a good translation of katargein.
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cut,  making  impossible  for  the  whole  and the  part  to  coincide.  Paul’s
universalism is not just indifferent to differences but rather cuts across
and suspends every previous identity, inviting us to make a new use of
ourselves as-if we were not who we are. The stake is not just to change
our juridical status or identity or to enforce a new Law but to deactivate
(katargein) them. 
In  his  view,  both  the  Messianic  and the  state  of  exception  work
through suspension. But while, according to Agamben, today we live in a
virtual state of exception in which the Law is suspended but still enforced,
making life prone to be eliminated, Paul’s messianism —which Agamben
reads  through Benjamin’s  glasses— strives  to  produce  a  real  state  of
exception in which Law and Life coincide.13 This coincidence is elsewhere
termed by Agamben form-of-life, a life that cannot be separated from its
form, in which a bare life cannot be produced. (2000, 3; 2011b) 
In  this  sense,  Agamben  opposes  the  community of  whatever
singularities (1990), and a  form-of-life based in the Franciscan notion of
use (2011b), to the sovereign power of the state. (1995) For Agamben, the
state produces and at the same time tries to capture the exception —the
bare life of the  homo sacer— and rule through it. It legitimizes its own
power through the representation of social identities which are based on
bare life. On the contrary, the  community recognizes no presuppositions
and no representation. It is an un-founded, indestructible remnant [resto],
where singularities co-belong, being-such: “the state can recognize any
assertion  of  identity  [...] but  that  the  singularities  form  community
without asserting an identity  [...] that is what the state cannot tolerate
under any circumstances” (1990, 58-59).
Here we see the contrast between Agamben’s position and that of
Laclau and Žižek. While according to Laclau the logic of hegemony and
articulation implies  a  political  constitution  of  identities and a  struggle
between  them  to  represent  the  whole,  Agamben  is  seeking  an
Unrepresentable remnant that gets rid of previous identities and threatens
the State’s  sovereign violence.  At  the same time,  while  Žižek sees dis-
identification as the element that holds together empirical communities
and calls for an ethics of over-identification, Agamben expresses the need
to  elude  identification  since  by  producing  identities  power  dispositifs
13 Drawing on the latter’s idea of communicability and of divine violence, as a violence
that does not institute a new Law, Agamben thinks the coming politics as a means
without  ends which should  turn the  virtual  (Schmittean)  state  of  exception in
which we live into a real (Benjaminian) one (1995).
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capture  our attempts  of  subjectification.14 That  is  why the community
Agamben  is  trying  to  think  is  beyond  identity,  since,  for  him,
contemporary politics have already emptied any tradition or identity of
meaning  and  deal  only  with  bare  life  (2000).  On  the  contrary,  the
messianic community cannot be institutionalized, because every form of
institutionalization or representation implies its  authoritarian negation:
“when the ekklesía —the messianic community— wants to organize itself,
the problem of the right doctrine and infallibility becomes crucial” (2008b,
37). 
In  this  sense,  while  Laclau  and  Žižek  introduce  a  transcendent
dimension in politics (party, state, leader, empty signifier), the impolitical
perspective  thinks  community  outside  the  transcendence  of  sovereign
power,  understanding  it  as  a  sacrificial  machine.  Against  such  view,
Laclau maintains that to be beyond sovereignty and exclusion is to be
beyond politics and that Agamben’s idea of politics is based on the myth of
a fully reconciled community (Laclau 2008, 123). As we saw, for Laclau
this  reconciliation  is  impossible  since  the  extension  of  structural
dislocations  at  work  in  contemporary  capitalism  make  visible  the
contingency and precariousness of any objectivity and create a plurality of
new  antagonisms,  opening  unprecedented  possibilities  for  the
radicalization  of  democracy  and  political  articulation.  In  this  sense,
processes of commodification, bureaucratization, etc. do not give birth to
a self-regulated totality. On the contrary, they open up the possibility of
new political  struggles  and change (Laclau,  1990).  In Agamben’s  view,
however, such dislocations —the Spectacle, the capitalist expropriation of
language and thought, the dissolution of traditional identities— are the
precondition for a redemptive outcome, namely a community or form-of-
life  beyond  sovereignty  and  property  in  which  the  role  of  politics  is
difficult to grasp. 
In this sense, while for Laclau any commonality is the precarious
result of political representation and hegemony, for  'impolitical' authors
the community is unrepresentable (Esposito 1988), it cannot be produced
but it can  take place (Agamben, 1990). However, there is an important
difference between Esposito and Agamben. For the first, the community is
not something that relates what it is, but being itself as relation. For the
latter, the common and the political must be thought beyond any form of
14 As  we  saw  above,  disidentification  is  for  Rancière  a  condition  of  policial
subjetification.
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relation, where the first step is to think potentiality without any relation
to actuality (1995). In this sense, whatever singularity, as a reformulation
of  Dasein,  means for Agamben the impossibility  of  isolating substance
and modes, individuality and universality. At stake here is a form-of-life
which reflects human life as (im)potentiality, since human beings have no
predefined biological task (2000).
Also,  whereas  Laclau  and  Žižek  strive  to  rethink  political
subjectivities,  Agamben and Esposito explore the  Impersonal dimension
that exceeds the subjective and legal status of the person which, in their
view, produces the separations between higher and lower forms of life.
The stake for both authors is to think a life-in-common previous to the
divide  between  bios and  zoé,  person and  non-person by  the  Legal
apparatus. Indeed, through this notion of impersonal life, Esposito tries to
think the possibility of  affirmative biopolitics, turning against themselves
the dispositifs that Nazism employed against its victims (Esposito 2004 &
2007). In his view, if biopolitics continue to lead to the destruction of the
only thing that can legitimate today’s governments (life itself) it is because
the dispositif of the person is founded upon the separation between bios
and zoé, qualified life and mere life. 
Like Agamben, Esposito opposes the community of singularities to
state sovereignty. However, he considers that the notion of  profanations
implies that something should be  consecrated first in order to be later
made  profane  (2010),  while  immunization  paradigm  remains  always
attached to the immanence of life itself. In this sense, while Agamben has
to recourse to Messianism to think politics,  for Esposito immunization
implies that a politics of life (politica della vita) can be thought out of any
theologico-political root, in the same terrain of biopower.
Indeed, the recourse to religious categories to think the political in
the last  decades would reveal our incapacity to eschew the theologico-
political paradigm. However, Esposito’s formulation arrives at a deadlock
when trying to think politics in positive terms, since the immunization
paradigm can only be a quasi-transcendental framework for present-day
politics that cannot offer any positive content.  That is  the reason why
when he  tries  to  think  affirmative  biopolitics,  instead  of  drawing  from
political experiences,  he  makes  use  of  metaphors  like  birth,  or
philosophical categories such as norm-of-life (Canguilhem), chair (Merleau-
Ponty),  or  impersonal  life (Deleuze).  At  the  same time,  this is  why the
prefix we find in all his notions is the «im-», from the impolitical to the
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impersonal through immunization. 
To sum up, impolitical authors criticize any form of mediation of the
community in a separate sphere, any form of representation which, as
Esposito maintains, is always a representation of Order (1993). They also
criticize the role identities play in politics. They share a moment of retreat
and the assertion of norm/form-of-life (Esposito 2004; Agamben 2011b)
against any type of legal and political transcendence. These authors are
critical  of  liberal  democracy  since  it  can  be  seen  as  immunitarian
(Esposito 2008) and since the predominance of government has done away
with  any  form  of  popular  sovereignty  (Agamben  2011a).  Nonetheless,
despite writing about government and biopolitics, these authors usually
have  a  negative  approach  on  power  that  does  not  let  them  consider
seriously  present  day  governance.15 We  will  come  back  to  this  in  the
concluding remarks. 
IV. Concluding remarks
In  this  paper  I  tried  to  show  that  political  and  impolitical
perspectives think the common in a non-foundational way, as they do not
presuppose any substantial or stable ground for it. At the same time, both
recognize that a full closure or total reconciliation of the community is
impossible and has proved politically deadly. However, as we have seen,
they  are  not  post-foundational  in  the  same  way:  while  the  political
perspective tries to fill the void of the community and «name the nothing»
stressing the relevance of politically construed identities (Laclau) and the
ontological  function  of  the  Subject  as  the  absent  center  of  political
ontology (Žižek), the impolitical suggests that this void should not be filled
if we want to avoid new modes of thanatological exclusion. While for the
first perspective the common is  politically construed, for the second it is
beyond politics and cannot be politically produced. That is why the first
assumes  that  politics  consist  in  activism  and  strives  to  find  an
emancipatory subject (the people, the proletariat, etc.) while in impolitical
thought the stake is to deactivate any form of subjectivity and power, in
15 In Il regno e la gloria (2007), Agamben speaks of a bi-polar machine constituted by
sovereignty  and  oikonomical government,  in  which  the  latter  predominates.
Nonetheless,  instead  of  giving  an  account  of  today’s  theories  and  practice  of
governance, he makes an archeology of theological texts to reveal the separation
between a  transcendent  reign of  god,  who  reigns  but  doesn’t  govern,  and  the
immanent oikonimical government by the angels (ministers). Also Esposito (2013)
refers to economics through the filter of the theological debate.
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order to avoid reinforcing the domination over life, namely, the capture of
subjectification by power  dispositifs. That is why Agamben stresses the
necessity  to  think ontology  beyond the paradigm of  operativeness and
effectiveness as a first step to rethink politics (2012) and Esposito tries to
think the Impersonal as the improper dimension of life common to every
being. 
Therefore,  the main questions that divide the two views are: is a
community  of  singularities  the  result  of  political  action  or  impolitical
deactivation?  We  may  add:  does  deactivation  lead  to  a  depoliticized,
aesthetic  or  ethicist  stance?  And  also:  what  form  of  commonality  is
thinkable within and beyond today’s society of control?
So far, I have tried to suggest that both approaches provide useful
insights to think politics and commonality in our societies, but that none
of them is completely satisfactory, and that their limits come to light as a
function of their mutual delimitation. On the side of the political, forms of
progressive political activism can reinforce domination and control despite
themselves.  On the side of  the impolitical,  forms of exodus and retreat
from sovereignty can have unforeseen political effects. However, what is
missing in both approaches is, first, a better account of today’s forms of
domination and, then, new ideas concerning an alternative political power
that  could  provide  the  chance  to  avoid  the  choice  between
‘inoperativeness’,  ‘neo-Stalinism’  and  ‘investments  in  a  name’,  i.e.,
between  trying  to  interrupt  the  ‘machine’  without  enabling  a  political
alternative and the institution of new forms of heteronomy. 
In this  sense,  the  impolitical view allows us to  bear  in mind the
deadlocks of subjectivist approaches to the notion of community, which
seem  to  lead  sooner  or  later  to  re-establish  the  idea  that  it  can  be
produced by  a  party,  ethnical  identity  or  any  privileged  Subject,  in  a
sacrificial  and authoritarian position.  On the other hand,  the  ‘political
stance’  is  also  important  to  understand  possible  ways  of  political
subjectification,  trying to avoid a nihilistic  standpoint  towards politics.
Indeed, if impolitical thought becomes a critical stance towards any actual
politics,  it  risks  becoming  ultrapolitical,16 in the  sense of  being  beyond
politics, always needing to face the Leviathan in order to be sure we are
on the good side. 
But is any form of political institution a kind of ‘cold monster’? Or
should we focus on forms of government? Is the retreat from the State an
16 I thank Bruno Bosteels for discussing this point with me back in 2010.
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existential  need,  an  ethical  imperative  or  a  suicidal  action?  We  have
already commented on Laclau’s critique of Agamben’s dream of politics
without exclusions. Similarly, Žižek (2008) criticizes the retreat from state
power by suggesting that  ‘local  struggles’  and ‘infinite  demands’17 only
reinforce the position of those who rule. Instead of resisting state power or
retreating from it, he suggests that true revolutionaries should try to seize
it  (2007).  But  does  it  make  any  sense  to  speak  today  of  ‘true
revolutionaries’ and the seizure of state power in complex and globalized
societies? 
In  my  view,  the  limits  of  both  perspectives  stem  from  the  very
diagnoses they make. Despite providing useful insights, both stances have
a  reductive  understanding  of  today’s  forms  of  domination,  which
undermines  their  capacity  to  elaborate  a  positive  account  of  the
communality  to  emerge  and politics  to  come.  In this  sense,  impolitical
thought seems to be still secretly obsessed with sovereign power and with
theological and juridical  dispositifs when today’s forms of (bio)power are
much more subtle  and productive.  While  it  is  true that  the  exception
became  the  rule  of  government  and  that  racism  is  far  from  being
overcome, what is taking place in today’s societies of control is rather the
'inclusion  of  the  outside'.  Whereas  classic  sovereign  power  and  even
disciplinary  societies  belong  to  a  mechanical-analogical  era,  today’s
biopolitical  or  noopolitical (Lazzarato  2004)  power  became  molecular,
informational and digital (Deleuze 1990; Sibilia 2005). Today’s main forms
of (bio)power do not forbid or enclose bodies but modulate subjectivities at
a distance, and the subject/object of power is not only the population as a
biological aggregate but also the  public as a sociological reality. Today’s
(bio)power  does  not  employ  our  muscles,  but  stimulates  our  neural
centers. It does not to forbid our enjoyment but makes it mandatory. 
The  oppressive  contours  of  this  injunction  to  enjoy have  been
analyzed by Žižek through the study of the Lacanian superego (passim). In
a  way,  it  has  also  been  recognized  by  Agamben,  who  stresses  the
impossibility to resist a Power that makes us believe that everything can
be  done,  separating  us  from  our  potentiality  not-to-do  (2009,  69).
However, this problem is absent in Esposito and Laclau’s accounts. 
Indeed, even though Laclau’s logic of politics seems to work at the
level  of  political  discourse  and  aggregation,  he  does  not  engage  in
17 Here Zizek attacks Critchley’s book  Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment,
Politics of Resistance, London: Verso, 2007.
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understanding  today’s  forms  of  power  in  ‘developed  societies’  where
demands and desires are more likely to be construed and fulfilled through
marketing  and  consumption  or  self-entrepreneurship  rather  than  by
libidinal investments in politics. Nowadays the ‘affective investment in a
name’  with  which  Laclau  describes  the  construction  of  ‘the  people’  is
likely  to  be  done  by  political  marketing.  Besides,  it  also  implies  the
identification with a body that incarnates the community, reinstating a
theological dimension in politics. A postmodern theology in which no Idea
mobilizes the people: only a name, or slogan.
Of  course,  my  assertion  implies  leaving  aside  contingency  for  a
moment  and  taking  a  ‘substantive’  and  ‘outmoded’  view  of  politics  as
something different from marketing and consumption. It also implies a
critical view on marketing as a subtler but no less authoritarian way of
constructing  political  images  and  social  identities  compared  to  the
Totalitarian  propaganda.  However,  as  mentioned  above,  this
spectacularization of politics and this commodification of social identities
can have a positive outcome for both Laclau and Agamben. For the first,
the  dislocations  these  processes  imply  open  the  possibility  of  new
demands,  struggles  and  political  articulation.  For  the  latter,  the
possibility  of  a  community  without  identity  is  the  result  of  the
expropriation of  the Common brought about by today’s capitalism and
this  opportunity  should  be  used against  the  Spectacle  (1990).  In  this
sense,  the  logic  of  profanation implies  the  possibility  to  create  an
alternative  economy  of  social  interaction,  production  and  enjoyment
related to what Agamben calls use.
The absence of a study of today’s governance is also a problem in
Esposito’s  account.  Although  drawing  on  Foucault  and  Deleuze,
Esposito’s  reflection  has  not  fully  engaged  with  an  analysis  of  the
economic and subjective aspects of today’s forms of power which employ
the subjects’ desires and creativity in their reproduction. Even if he has
tried  to  overcome  a  merely  deconstructive  approach  through  the
immunization  paradigm,  his  analyses  remain all  too  ontological.  First,
even though he  acknowledges  the  necessity  of  conflict  for  politics,  he
never  privileges  a  particular  form  of  politics.  Second,  despite  that  he
recognizes transformations in the exercise of power, his diagnosis —like
Agamben’s—  seems  too  obsessed  with  Sovereign  Power  and  its  legal
apparatus. Third, as said before, his idea of affirmative biopolitics draws
on examples we can barely call political. Assuming that any form of action
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means  the  increase  of  violence,  Esposito  proposes  to  rethink  the
impersonal dimension and, like Agamben, to advocate a ‘mystical’ life that
cannot be separated from its forms, a deactivation of both the Law and its
subject. 
In this sense, I think the gesture of retreating to think the common
in its  ontological,  a-subjective  and  impersonal condition is  only a  first
step. If today’s forms of domination involve our whole ‘being and time’, if
the  administration  and  the  corporations  treat  us  as  a  sample  of
prosumers from whom they can obtain ‘valuable’ information through new
forms  of  confession  to  capture  our  desires  for  their  profit  and
reproduction, one of the resources at hand is to deny our participation,
'become invisible', and deactivate this  governmentality that puts to work
our  political  capabilities  (Virno  2001).  However,  without  considering
political subjectivization one cannot avoid the risk of treating any form of
real  political  action  as  a  simulacrum  that  doesn’t  correspond  to  its
ontological truth (Bosteels 2009).
Then, my suggestion here is that in order to redefine the contours of
the common we need a new politics which should not be the same play of
ideologically  overdetermined  desires,  particular  demands  and  its
representation  through  spectacular politics  or  strong  and  glorified
leaderships. In this sense, Agamben’s idea of  use (2011b) is interesting
since nowadays social cooperation and codependence has reached a point
in which in a way we already form a global community and have to decide
what  sense  we  will  give  to  our  coexistence  and  how  will  we  use  the
resources at hand. While the capitalist logic will employ this cooperation
for private benefit without any concern for the common, Agamben invites
us to think  new uses, not only of objects but also of ourselves, of our
common  world,  without  abusing it,  in  a  community  of  singularities
without conditions for belonging. 
How to translate this ontological view into political action is a great
challenge.  For  even  if  re-thinking  the  common  and  politics  anew  is
necessary,  the  ontological  speculation  should  not  be  a  psychological
compensation for good politics’ absence but rather a step in inventing new
political practices in which a more emancipated commonality can emerge.
In this sense, the impolitical gesture of retreat might be tactically useful
against a power that involves our subjectivities in its reproduction, but
the real stake of this retreat is whether a new politics can be  re-traced
(Nancy  and  Lacoue-Labarthe  1997).  That  is  why  new  uses must  be
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invented,  profaning an  outdated  idea  of  property  and  also  an
authoritarian  notion  of  politics  in  order  to  produce  new  political
experiences. To do so, we cannot sever the common from the political: not
even with Apelles’s help. 
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